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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE COURTS  
In Climate Change and the Courts, Professors Jason S. Johnston and 
Heidi M. Hurd debate whether there should be a public nuisance tort 
for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in light of the Court’s recent de-
cision in American Electric Power (AEP) v. Connecticut.  Professor Johns-
ton argues that the Court has itself in a bind:  relying on EPA v. Massa-
chusetts, the Court found that the EPA’s regulation of GHGs displaced 
common law tort actions.  However, on Johnston’s view, EPA v. Massa-
chusetts should be overruled by statute, in which case a later challenge 
to AEP v. Connecticut might succeed.  Johnston’s concern is that nei-
ther the courts nor the EPA are in a proper position to regulate a 
harm that he considers distant and speculative, ultimately concluding 
that if there should be any regulation of GHGs at all, it should come 
from Congress.  Such legislation, he argues, will be nuanced based on 
the needs of particular states.  
In response, Professor Hurd suggests that Johnston incorrectly 
frames the question, which should be whether the petitioners “have 
violated the common law entitlement to be free from unreasonable 
injury,” a question which can only be decided by courts.  Hurd argues 
that the purpose of tort law is “corrective justice,” and the focus 
should not be whether the injury caused by the GHG-emitting com-
panies was de minimis or whether reducing emissions without an 
agreement from China will ultimately curb climate change, but 
whether the companies have caused harm to the respondents.  If so, 
Hurd continues, the petitioners should be required to internalize the 
costs of these injuries, exactly what tort law is prepared to do. 
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Public Nuisance Liability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
A Cause of Action that Should Not Exist 
Jason Scott Johnston†
The best one can say about the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in American Electric Power Co. (AEP) v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 
(2011), is that it could have been worse.  The Court could have al-
lowed the case to proceed.  Instead, it reasoned without dissent that 
since the Clean Air Act (CAA) covers greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and authorizes the federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to promulgate a comprehensive and enforceable set of GHG 
regulations, federal common law actions seeking abatement of carbon 
dioxide emissions from fossil fuel–fired power plants are displaced.  
Id. at 2532.  As this displacement theory had been advanced by the 
Obama Administration itself, it was an easy way, even for the Court’s 
global warming liberals, to terminate this federal interstate public 
nuisance lawsuit.  Easy because, according to Justice Ginsburg’s opi-
nion for the Court, since Congress has already designated the EPA, an 
“expert agency,” as the “primary regulator of greenhouse gas emis-
sions,” there is no need for the federal courts to assume the job of re-
gulating GHG emissions, as they would necessarily be called upon to 
do if they determined that GHG emissions constituted an interstate 
public nuisance.  Id. at 2539.  Instead, the EPA moves first, employing 
its superior expertise in promulgating regulations that limit GHG 
emissions, with the federal courts then playing only their traditional 
role in reviewing the agency’s GHG regulations under the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard.  Id. at 2540.  As Justice Ginsburg explains, 
this more limited judicial role is justified both by the superior “scientif-
ic, economic, and technological resources” possessed by the EPA and by 
Congress’s decision in the CAA to entrust the EPA with the job of ba-
lancing the “competing interests” of environmental benefits and the 
“economic disruption” from GHG emission regulation.  Id. at 2539-40. 
 
 
† Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation Professor of Law and Nicho-
las E. Chimicles Research Professor in Business Law and Regulation, University of Vir-
ginia Law School.  A.B. Dartmouth College; J.D., Ph.D., the University of Michigan.  I 
am grateful to Professor Hurd for engaging in this debate with me, and to Ken Abra-
ham, Leslie Kendrick, and Caleb Nelson for many helpful comments on and discus-
sions about my contributions to this debate. 
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The idea that Congress gave the EPA the job of regulating GHG 
emissions under the CAA—the Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)—is absurd.  Just how absurd will become 
apparent as the federal courts, and likely the Supreme Court, deal 
with legal challenges to the EPA’s GHG regulation under the CAA.  In 
such challenges, the courts will hear how in finding that GHG emis-
sions reasonably may be expected to “endanger” human health, the 
EPA relied almost entirely upon the conclusions of an increasingly 
discredited U.N. scientific assessment organization—the Intergo-
vernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  They will also hear 
how the EPA has decided, that despite almost forty years of practice 
and a well-settled understanding to the contrary, it shares statutory au-
thority with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to set 
fuel economy standards for automobiles.  Finally, the courts will listen 
as the EPA explains that, because millions of businesses emit more 
than 250 tons of GHG emissions per year and would therefore be re-
gulated as stationary sources under the language of the CAA, the EPA 
has rewritten the CAA so that only those facilities with GHG emissions 
of more than 25,000 tons per year will be regulated as stationary 
sources under the statute.  Having failed to reach the correct result in 
Massachusetts v. EPA—that regulating GHG emissions under the CAA 
was never contemplated by Congress and would lead to absurd results, 
and that states in any event have no standing to complain in court 
about what they had failed to achieve in Congress—the courts will be 
faced with the prospect of contorting administrative law in ways that 
will allow the EPA effectively to rewrite federal statutes by determining 
not only which firms are regulated but also how far it may extend its 
own remedial authority, and to base national environmental policy 
with multi-trillion dollar consequences on the highly politicized 
“scientific” findings of U.N.-sponsored institutions. 
One hopes that before this spectacle fully unfolds in the courts, 
Congress will pass legislation overturning Massachusetts v. EPA and cla-
rifying that the CAA does not apply to GHG emissions.  Of course, if 
this occurs, then there will no longer be a “displacing” federal regula-
tory scheme for GHG emissions, and under the Court’s reasoning in 
AEP v. Connecticut, there will be an open question as to whether that 
or other interstate public nuisance actions can survive.  Relying as it 
did on the displacement theory, the Court’s opinion in AEP v. Connect-
icut of course says nothing about either standing or the rationale and 
contemporary limits to the interstate public nuisance doctrine.  
Hence, there is a very real risk that the elimination of GHG regulation 
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under the CAA could revive the global warming interstate public nuis-
ance lawsuits.  This would be a disastrous outcome.  Such actions are 
no longer needed and are harmful to both democracy and sound 
public policy.  This applies not only to a case like AEP v. Connecticut—
in which states sought injunctive relief against private firms operating 
in other states—but also to other interstate public nuisance cases in-
volving private or municipal plaintiffs seeking damages from private 
firms.  See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 
2010) (dismissing an appeal brought by a group of private plaintiffs); 
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting the firms’ motion to dismiss in a case 
brought by a municipality). 
The public policy justification for interstate public nuisance dif-
fers from the policy justifications for torts generally.  Ordinary tort 
liability is conventionally justified as furthering the goals of both de-
terrence and compensation.  The original justification for interstate 
public nuisance liability for pollution was not, in my view, either to de-
ter or compensate, but to provide a forum for states to bargain to re-
solve such interstate disputes.  The first interstate public nuisance ac-
tions, Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), and Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), arose at a time in U.S. history when it 
was generally agreed that Congress lacked the constitutional authority 
to regulate interstate pollution and also understood that one state 
lacked the constitutional power to regulate activities in another state.  
Hence, at that point in our constitutional history, if the Court had not 
agreed to arbitrate these early interstate nuisance disputes, then a 
victim state only had the options of essentially recognizing a right in 
the polluting state to pollute, or taking potentially violent steps in 
reprisal.  (One must remember that for Justice Holmes, writing in 
1906-07, violent reprisal was not some rhetorical fancy:  Holmes had 
fought and was injured in three separate battles during the Civil War.) 
On this theory, unlike traditional common law torts—where the 
civil justice system provides a remedy if the plaintiff can establish duty, 
breach, causation, proximate causation, and harm—the purpose of 
interstate public nuisance was never to provide a remedy, but rather to 
provide a forum for interjurisdictional bargaining.  This theory is con-
sistent with the one clear feature in all of the federal courts’ interstate 
public nuisance opinions:  that the courts do not want to decide such 
disputes, but rather want the public and private parties to reach a bar-
gained resolution.  Moreover, this theory makes sense of the extreme-
ly amorphous substantive standard in interstate public nuisance cas-
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es—requiring roughly that the plaintiff state establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that its citizens have suffered a serious harm that was 
caused by an activity of the defendant that it, the plaintiff, does not it-
self allow.  While such a vague standard may be undesirable from the 
perspective of ex ante deterrence, such a standard actually encourages 
bargaining relative to a world where courts refuse to intervene at all. 
True, there are a small number of interstate public nuisance cases, 
such as Tennessee Copper, where the federal courts actually used their 
equitable authority to order a private polluter to take certain steps to 
reduce pollution.  But, once again, Tennessee Copper was decided at a 
time when there was either a judicial remedy based on interstate pub-
lic nuisance or no remedy at all.  It is atypical in the extreme:  most of 
the interstate public nuisance cases involved states on both sides, and 
most of them dragged on for many years as the states continued to 
bargain and haggle over their particular interstate pollution problem.  
The controversy over the various alleged harms caused to residents of 
St. Louis by the city of Chicago’s diversion of the Chicago River, at is-
sue in the Court’s 1906 decision in Missouri v. Illinois, lasted for dec-
ades, as it expanded to include states such as New York, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin, which argued that diversion had lowered the level of the 
Great Lakes, thus harming navigation.  The dispute between New York 
and New Jersey over New Jersey’s plan to dump sewage into New York 
Bay likewise took decades to settle.  The Court’s final word was the 
weary “suggestion” that 
the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and grow-
ing populations living on the shores of New York Bay is one more likely 
to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual 
concession on the part of representatives of the States so vitally interest-
ed in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted. 
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921). 
 Most interstate public nuisance disputes eventually disappeared as 
Congress either authorized an interstate compact among the affected 
states—with the courts then asked only to enforce the terms of the 
compact—or passed general legislation covering the type of pollution 
problem involved in the particular nuisance case.  Thus, in my view, 
interstate public nuisance was designed to provide a forum for inter-
state bargaining when such bargaining could not occur in Congress.  
Given that it now can and does occur in Congress, there is no longer a 
role for the federal common law of interstate public nuisance. 
To this it might be objected that even with clear constitutional au-
thority for Congress to deal legislatively with interstate pollution prob-
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lems, interstate public nuisance still plays an important, if residual, 
role in allowing the federal courts to step in and remedy interstate 
public nuisances that Congress has failed to address.  This argument, 
it must be admitted, has constitutional support in Article III’s clear 
vesting of the federal judicial power over “[c]ontroversies between two 
or more states.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Moreover, as has long been 
recognized, the resolution of interstate disputes has traditionally been 
considered a core area of federal common law. 
However, such interstate disputes subject to traditional federal 
common law have almost always involved state borders or the alloca-
tion of shared boundary waters.  The Court’s seminal interstate pollu-
tion cases—Missouri v. Illinois and Tennessee Copper—both involved 
what may be called boundary-line pollution, with an allegedly direct 
connection between the offending activity upstream and the alleged 
harm downstream (where “stream” may, as in Tennessee Copper, include 
airstream).  The Court has in fact never before exercised jurisdiction 
over an interstate public nuisance case where the connection between 
the activities of the defendants and the alleged harm suffered by the 
plaintiff states is as indirect and highly speculative as it was in AEP v. 
Connecticut.  Moreover, the Court has never before exercised jurisdic-
tion over an interstate public nuisance suit where, by the plaintiff 
states’ own admission, the defendants’ actions—emitting GHGs—are 
both engaged in by and causing harm to virtually every person or 
business in the United States, the overwhelming majority of whom are 
not parties to the lawsuit. 
Both of these features—indirect and highly speculative harm, and 
extreme underinclusiveness on both the plaintiff and defendant side 
given the near universal nature of the activity and the alleged harm—
make the question of limiting GHG emissions unsuitable for judicial 
resolution.  As for the first feature, the more willing the Court is to 
hear cases where the interstate harm is speculative, indirect, and in-
capable of judicial remedy (as it is in the GHG-emissions-as-public-
nuisance cases), the greater federal judges’ freedom will be to create 
federal common law for any “interstate” problem that such judges 
deem serious.  And the further federal courts stray from confined 
and traditional notions of what constitutes an interstate dispute go-
verned by federal common law, the greater the risk that federal 
judges will effectively become super-legislators, supplementing fed-
eral legislation whenever they are persuaded that there is a serious 
“interstate” pollution problem or any other public harm that Con-
gress has failed to address. 
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If it focuses on the requirement that the plaintiff allege an “inter-
state” harm traditionally subject to federal common law, constitutional 
standing doctrine could itself prevent “interstate public nuisance” 
from becoming such a free-floating license for lawmaking by federal 
judges.  Constitutional standing would require that the plaintiff states 
present at least some credible evidence that (1) individuals in their 
states have been or are being harmed; (2) their harm is fairly and di-
rectly (and perhaps foreseeably) traceable to the defendants’ activi-
ties; and (3) a federal court could actually remedy that harm.  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  In the GHG-
emissions-as-public-nuisance cases, plaintiffs easily found experts to 
submit sworn affidavits that global warming has caused environmental 
changes—not because this is likely true, but because there are a large 
number of activist scientists who are committed to the belief that it is 
likely true.  But it would be much more difficult to credibly tie any indi-
vidual’s harm to such alleged environmental harm, and there is simply 
no reason to believe that any reduction in the GHG emissions of a few 
power companies could possibly remedy such individual harm. 
The second feature of the GHG-emissions-as-public-nuisance cas-
es—the fact that millions of people in every state engage in the activity 
and suffer the harm that it allegedly causes, but only a few are parties 
to the lawsuit—raises even more serious policy concerns.  Disputes 
over borders and the allocation of shared waters typically involve a small 
number of states, and it is at least arguable, despite the large number of 
congressionally authorized interstate compacts, that when such a small 
number of states are involved, Congress might well not take an interest 
in the matter.  Thus, the federal courts would have to step in to provide 
the only forum where interstate bargaining might take place.  However, 
when the allegedly harmful activity—emitting GHGs—is conducted in 
every state, with potential impacts in every state, an interstate public 
nuisance action that allows some plaintiff states to pick and choose de-
fendant firms in other plaintiff states is almost certain to generate out-
comes with which Congress would never agree. 
In an interstate public nuisance suit over GHG emissions, plaintiff 
states whose representatives perceive big benefits from emission re-
duction are free to pick and choose as defendants out-of-state private 
firms that bear only a portion of the full social cost of pollution reduc-
tion.  In AEP v. Connecticut, for example, the plaintiff states for the 
most part had relatively low per capita GHG emissions, primarily be-
cause their electric utilities did not use much coal as a fuel source in 
power plants.  Thus the plaintiff states had low costs and relatively 
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high perceived benefits from GHG emission reduction.  They were 
highly unrepresentative of the United States as a whole, which in-
cludes states that will disproportionately bear the costs of GHG emis-
sion reduction—such as the Dakotas, Wyoming, and West Virginia—
and that will almost surely have large net losses from GHG emission 
reduction.  The defendants in AEP v. Connecticut included a group of 
regulated public utilities that rely heavily on coal as a source of fuel 
for electricity generation, but none of which provide electricity to the 
citizens of the plaintiff states.  Thus if plaintiffs succeeded in a case 
such as AEP v. Connecticut, a federal judge or jury would get to decide 
that people—shareholders, power consumers, and ordinary citizens—
in some states should bear the entire cost of reducing GHG emissions 
in order to provide little, if any, benefit (and perhaps actually cause 
harm) to themselves while providing a highly speculative potential 
benefit to people who reside in other states. 
It is unimaginable that Congress would endorse such an outcome.  
Consider, for example, the recent Waxman-Markey bill of 2009 that 
would have created a national cap-and-trade scheme for reducing 
GHG emissions.  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).  In the economist’s idealized version 
of a cap-and-trade scheme—where individual emitters are given per-
mits to emit and then may comply either by reducing their emissions 
or buying permits from other emitters—virtually all distributional is-
sues are dealt with at the initial permit-allocation stage.  But Waxman-
Markey was filled with provisions designed to cut the costs of cap-and-
trade to various politically key states.  To lessen the cost of the bill to 
states that produce or rely upon coal for electricity, the bill included 
subsidies for the continued use of coal instead of natural gas—
subsidies that, according to the EPA, would have actually increased 
the share of power produced by coal-burning plants relative to what 
would be expected without the bill.  For agricultural states, the bill 
had a system of offsets whereby ordinary agricultural production 
would have generated GHG emission–reduction credits that could be 
sold to GHG-emitting firms in other states.  And for urban Democrats 
in states where heating costs can be high, Waxman-Markey included 
subsidies for electricity cost increases borne by the poor. 
Thus one clear lesson from Waxman-Markey is that any GHG 
emission–reduction legislation that makes it through Congress will 
not do what an interstate public nuisance action would do:  simply 
stick all the costs of such emission reduction on some states while giv-
ing others perceived benefits.  Of course, Waxman-Markey ultimately 
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failed to gain passage in both chambers.  Comments by various mem-
bers of Congress during the consideration of Waxman-Markey, 
coupled with Congress’s unanimous rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, 
indicate that Congress has not passed U.S. climate change legislation, 
in part, because many members of Congress doubt that unilateral ac-
tion by the United States to reduce its GHG emissions would generate 
real benefits for any state.  Probably the dominant congressional view 
has been that, even if there could be some future benefit to the United 
States from reducing GHG accumulations in the atmosphere, given the 
extremely rapid increase in GHG emissions from certain large indu-
strializing countries, in particular China, unilateral action by the United 
States will impose costs on Americans, with limited benefits in return. 
This is almost surely correct.  There is no credible economic 
model in which unilateral action by the United States to reduce its 
GHG emissions increases the probability that countries like China will 
take similar action, generating an actual potential future benefit.  I 
know of no public nuisance case, either interstate or one arising un-
der state law, where a court has found that the actions of the defen-
dants constitute a public nuisance and must be curtailed even though 
the harm from their actions will be abated if, and only if, other coun-
tries require their citizens to curtail their comparable actions.  For a 
court to ignore the international nature of the GHG-accumulation is-
sue and simply order some American power companies to reduce 
their emissions on the ground that they constitute a public nuisance 
would be to impose potentially huge and damaging costs on American 
firms and individuals with no benefit.  This would implement, 
through the common law, an irrational and harmful policy result that 
Congress has time and time again rejected.  The courts must clarify 
that there is no public nuisance cause of action for GHG emissions. 
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REBUTTAL 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Public Nuisances 
Heidi M. Hurd†
 If Professor Johnston had his way, greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sion standards would be set directly by Congress, or not at all.  This is 
because, as he argues, both the EPA and the courts are either too dis-
honest or too incompetent for the job. 
 
At the root of his cynicism about all but the most cynical of gov-
ernment’s branches is his skepticism about the validity of fears regard-
ing anthropogenic climate change.  Disparaging the EPA’s reliance on 
the “highly politicized ‘scientific’ findings” of “an increasingly discre-
dited U.N. scientific assessment organization—the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change,” Professor Johnston worries that courts will 
be similarly corrupted by experts who will “submit sworn affidavits that 
global warming has caused environmental changes—not because this 
is likely true, but because there are a large number of activist scientists 
who are committed to the belief that it is likely true.” 
It would seem to me that if one is skeptical of climate science be-
cause of a fear of politicization, then one would not transfer one’s 
faith from scientists to politicians who are nothing if not political.  On 
the other hand, it is easy to think that Congress is the appropriate ve-
nue for disputes about GHG emissions if one fundamentally disbe-
lieves the warnings about anthropogenic climate change.  If fear of 
global warming is like fear of snipes, then one should be unconcerned 
about leaving the matter to politicians who will, ex hypothesi, do no 
harm if they do nothing.  Were Professor Johnston to believe that the 
fate of humanity and of many of the Earth’s other miraculous life 
forms turned on the tons of GHG emissions that Americans, among 
others, put into the atmosphere during this century, it is hard to im-
agine that he would be as sanguine about vesting decisions about 
GHG emissions in the hands of our elected politicians whose job de-
scription is to champion the interests of the few (their constituents) 
over the interests of the many, and whose practice is to elevate their 
own election prospects over the interests of all.   
 
† David C. Baum Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Illi-
nois.  My thanks to Jason Johnston for sparring over this important topic.  My thanks 
also to Eric Freyfogle, Zhijun James Liu, Michael Moore, and Arden Rowell, for their 
very helpful thoughts about my contributions to this exchange. 
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Unlike Professor Johnston, I do not presume that the widespread 
consensus among climate scientists is so politicized as to be empirical-
ly invalid (and I have never understood why the global community of 
scientists would have an interest in betraying the principles of their 
discipline to convince us that the sky is falling if there is no danger of 
it so doing).  I thus do not share Professor Johnston’s comfortable no-
tion that we are very likely on a snipe hunt that can appropriately be 
left to those whose disfunctionalities will likely prevent a serious chase. 
Were I to indulge my own institutional skepticisms, I would raise 
countervailing worries about the degree to which those at the EPA 
have been captured, or at least unduly influenced, by the very indus-
tries that they are charged with policing.  My worry, in other words, 
would be about the corporatization of administrative agencies, rather 
than the politicization of scientific panels.  This is to say that Professor 
Johnston and I share doubts about the EPA as an unbiased arbiter of 
the potential problems posed by GHG emissions, even as his doubts 
concern the EPA’s corruption by left-leaning environmentalists while 
mine concern its corruption by right-leaning corporate moguls. 
What we do not share is a similar distrust of the ability of courts to 
adjudicate disputes that might arise either despite EPA rulemaking 
concerning GHG emissions or in its absence, were Congress to con-
tradict the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007), by explicitly specifying that the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
does not apply to GHG emissions, as Professor Johnston hopes it will.  
Professor Johnston expresses relief over the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in American Electric Power Co. (AEP) v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 
2527 (2011), in which it concluded that federal common law actions 
seeking curtailment of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel–fired 
power plants are displaced by the emission standards set by the EPA 
pursuant to the CAA.  Id. at 2532.  His relief stems from his conviction 
that judges ought not to employ tort law to address harms as “specula-
tive, indirect, and incapable of judicial remedy” as are those in public 
nuisance cases that concern GHG emissions.  As he argues, judges can-
not help but trade their appropriate role as adjudicators for that of “su-
per-legislators” when they seek to redress harms from phenomena as 
multi-caused and multi-causal as global warming. 
Professor Johnston’s dismissal of the notion that these cases prop-
erly belong to tort law is premised, however, on a Potemkin view of 
the scope and purposes of tort law.  As he conceives it, tort liability is 
justified only when it can further “the goals of . . . deterrence and 
compensation.”  As a regulatory instrument, one might well think that 
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tort law would compete poorly with congressional or agency action 
when it comes to setting GHG emissions standards, for as Professor 
Johnston suggests, decisions concerning how best to set such stan-
dards require a balancing of economic costs and environmental bene-
fits.  It is plausible to think that such “bargained resolution[s]” are 
best achieved through democratic processes. 
Similarly, if tort law is conceived of as a vehicle for compensation, 
designed to spread losses in order to encourage the return to produc-
tivity of those who might otherwise be sidelined by crushing debts, 
then tort law should plausibly give way to social insurance schemes or 
other centrally organized compensation funds when harms are widely 
caused and widely distributed.  If these were our sole options, then 
one might join Professor Johnston in thinking that tort law cannot live 
up to its mission in cases involving GHG emissions, for both of its 
goals would indeed seemingly be better served by the actions of Con-
gress or a deputized agency. 
But tort law is not best justified by either of these goals, so the fact 
that it might serve them poorly in GHG emissions cases is neither here 
nor there.  Tort law is best justified by its unique ability to vindicate 
moral rights and to compel compensation for moral wrongs.  In the 
language of Professor Douglas Kysar’s amicus brief in AEP v. Connecti-
cut (to which I was a signatory): 
[W]hether or not courts appear inferior to other institutions in address-
ing the climate change problem depends first on how one constructs 
“the problem.” 
The most appropriate construction of the problem raised by the instant 
litigation is one that can be addressed only by courts:  Have the actions of 
Petitioners violated the common law entitlement of Respondents to be 
free from unreasonable injury? 
Brief Amici Curiae of Tort Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 
2, AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 10-174), 2011 WL 1042198. 
Tort law is principally devoted to ensuring that corrective justice is 
achieved after citizens have been wronged; it is only incidentally a 
source of incentives for avoiding wrongdoing to begin with.  Its task is 
backward looking, not forward looking.  While tort law has a rich un-
derstanding of the kinds of wrongs that will merit liability, statutory 
enactments and agency regulations may better fulfill the forward-
looking task of optimizing incentives to avoid wrongdoing (by, for ex-
ample, setting standards concerning GHG emissions).  But to say that 
tort law might not be the ideal mechanism for deterring the over-
production of GHG emissions is not to say that it would not be an ap-
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propriate arbiter—indeed, the only appropriate arbiter—of claims 
that disproportionate GHG emissions have constituted wrongs to oth-
ers who are entitled to injunctive or compensatory relief. 
Anticipating, perhaps, that his is not the only, or even the most 
broadly accepted, view of tort law, Professor Johnston brushes aside all 
views of tort law as irrelevant with the claim that interstate public 
nuisance suits have really never been tort suits at all, and therefore, 
should not invite analysis according to traditional tort rationales of 
any stripe.  On his account, “the purpose of interstate public nuisance 
was never to provide a remedy, but rather to provide a forum for interju-
risdictional bargaining.”  Inasmuch as Congress now provides that fo-
rum, there is no need, in his view, to employ public nuisance law as a 
vehicle for interstate negotiation. 
But Professor Johnston’s opposition of tort and settlement is a 
false one.  Even the most traditional tort cases provide forums for bar-
gained settlement.  The fact that parties seek to settle suits in the 
course of trying them—and that courts encourage such settlement—
does not make such suits anything other than torts suits, just as the 
common practice of plea bargaining does not make criminal cases fo-
ra for prosecutorial bargaining rather than true criminal cases.  So 
Professor Johnston cannot dismiss public nuisance cases from the ju-
risdiction of tort law simply by pointing to the historical fact that the 
threat of tort liability has successfully motivated public parties to pers-
ist in settlement efforts.  And he cannot deny that such suits raised 
plausible claims for corrective justice simply because Congress even-
tually enacted laws that were more comprehensive in their remedial 
scope than anything specifically sought by litigants.  So a defense of 
the legitimacy of suits such as AEP v. Connecticut cannot be mooted by 
the charge that it reflects a category mistake. 
Broadly speaking, tort law reflects two theories upon which citi-
zens (and the states of which they are citizens) are entitled to correc-
tive justice.  On one theory, the causal fault theory, citizens have a right 
to be made whole when they have suffered culpably caused harm.  On 
the other theory, the unjust enrichment theory, citizens have a right to 
restoration when others have deliberately externalized to them the costs 
of an activity, while asymmetrically internalizing its benefits.  In his third 
set of complaints about the use of public nuisance suits to redress 
harms that are a product of GHG emissions, Professor Johnston casts 
doubt on the ability of plaintiffs to meet the conditions for liability 
made relevant by both of these theories.  These, at least, are substantive 
arguments on which issue can be joined. 
11- FINAL UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2011 5:18 PM 
46 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 160:33 
Whether the plaintiffs in AEP v. Connecticut could bear the eviden-
tiary burdens required to persevere with a case for negligence merit-
ing a remedy according to the causal fault theory is something we 
cannot now know, and it is not something that Professor Johnston can 
decide, ex cathedra, to the contrary.  It is certainly no argument that 
the harm suffered by the plaintiffs is a harm suffered by “millions of 
people in every state.”  As William Prosser famously said,  
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the 
expense of a “flood of litigation,” and it is a pitiful confession of incom-
petence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such 
grounds. . . . [I]f injuries are multiplied, actions should be multiplied, so 
injured persons may have recompense. 
W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 56 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
Of more serious concern to the pursuit of liability on the causal 
fault theory is Professor Johnston’s fear that “[f]or a court to ignore 
the international nature of the GHG-accumulation issue and simply 
order some American power companies to reduce their emissions on 
the ground that they constitute a public nuisance would be to impose 
potentially huge and damaging costs on American firms and individu-
als with no benefit.”  Professor Johnston is right that if American 
plaintiffs will suffer the same climatically induced harms regardless of 
American defendants’ past, present, and predicted GHG emissions, 
then we need to have an account of how such harms could be thought 
to be caused by the defendants’ activities.  Given the rapid increase in 
GHG emissions from China and other industrializing nations, Profes-
sor Johnston could be right in thinking that American GHG emissions 
will become, in the grand scheme of things, de minimis.  (I actually 
think that this takes a good deal of imagination.  While China is now 
the leading producer of GHG emissions, the average American is re-
sponsible for more than four times the GHG emissions than is the 
average Chinese.  And because one-third of China’s emissions are 
the result of manufacturing goods for export and 40% of consumer 
goods purchased in America are made in China, a sizable portion of 
China’s GHG emissions should be marked “made in America!”) 
But here is the rub.  Even if American GHG emissions turn out to 
be de minimis by comparison to the GHG emissions of other nations, 
de minimis contributions function as true causes of harm, despite 
their comparatively small nature.  When someone joins a gang in 
stabbing a victim, the fact that the cuts he inflicts are small relative to 
those inflicted by others does not defeat the conviction that he con-
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currently causes the victim’s death when the victim bleeds to death, in 
part, through his smaller wounds.  The fact that the victim would have 
bled to death anyway is neither here nor there; for the death he in fact 
died was caused, in part, by the lesser wounds of the timid contributor. 
So while global warming may never have happened (or may never 
happen in a manner that is catastrophic) but for China’s GHG emis-
sions, if America’s GHG emissions are among those that are physically 
absorbing thermal radiation from the planetary surface, then they can 
be counted as causes of the harms sustained by Americans as a result 
of climate change.  Put differently, “small causes” of harms are none-
theless causes.  Inasmuch as tort law can and does treat “small causers” 
as joint tortfeasors even when they are individually neither necessary 
nor sufficient, the plaintiffs in AEP v. Connecticut ought not to have been 
barred from suing the defendants just because those defendants have 
Chinese counterparts whose activities are similarly bleeding the atmos-
phere of its absorption capacities.  Were a court worried that future 
suits might seek more than the injunctive relief sought by the AEP v. 
Connecticut plaintiffs, it could squelch fears of joint and several liability 
by crafting a variation of the creative market share liability scheme fa-
mously devised in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
In the alternative, the plaintiffs in AEP v. Connecticut might plausi-
bly have predicated their demand for relief from climate-affecting 
GHG emissions on the second theory of tort liability, unjust enrich-
ment.  The power made possible by coal is inexpensively produced 
and inexpensively purchased only because so many of its costs are ex-
ternalized to others.  Consider just some of the costs associated with 
coal that are not included in the price of electricity produced by coal-
burning power plants: 
 Coal fires in underground mines are expected to burn for 
centuries and currently contribute as much carbon dio-
xide to the atmosphere as all American vehicles do.1
 While 30% of coal is still mined underground, companies 
can obtain two-and-a-half times more coal per worker per 
hour through mountaintop removal and valley fill.
  Such 
climatic costs are not included in the price of coal. 
2
 
1 See Glenn B. Stracher & Tammy P. Taylor, Coal Fires Burning Out of Control Around 
the World: Thermodynamic Recipe for Environmental Catastrophe, 59 INT’L J. COAL GEOL-
OGY 7, 10 (2004). 
  Dur-
ing this process, a mountain is clear-cut, its lumber is sold, 
2 Most Requested Statistics: U.S. Coal Industry, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www.nma.org/ 
pdf/c_most_requested.pdf (last updated June 2011). 
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and its slash is burned.  The loss of its forest habitat and 
migratory resting places, the annihilation of its animal in-
habitants, the ensuing landslides and floods, and the at-
mospheric emissions caused by the massive mining 
equipment are not included in the price of coal.3
 To remove the layers of topsoil and shale that “overbur-
den” the coal seams below, well over 1000 metric tons of 
explosives per day are presently detonated.
   
4  The damage 
caused to local home foundations and wells and the in-
creased local rates of lung cancer and chronic heart, lung, 
and kidney disease caused by the fog of silica dust in 
which local citizens are forced to live are not included in 
the price of coal.5 To expose the veins of coal, eight-
million-pound, twenty-story-high machines with gymna-
sium-sized bases unburden coal companies of the “over-
burden” by dumping it into adjacent valleys.6  To date, 
over 2000 miles of Appalachian headwater streams have 
been buried in highly acidic mining waste.7
 Runoff pollutes downstream waters with silt high in iron 
and sulfur, the costs of which are not included in the price 
of coal.  “Coal washing” produces thousands of gallons of 
sludge thick in carcinogenic chemicals and heavy metals, 
floods of which have killed and injured thousands and 
caused hundreds of millions of dollars of damage.
  The costs of 
transforming incomparably beautiful, environmentally es-
sential mountain ecosystems into biologically dead moon-
scapes are not included in the price of coal. 
8
 
3 See M. A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327 SCIENCE 148, 148-49 
(2010); see also Mid-Atlantic Mountaintop Mining, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/region03/mtntop/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
 De-
4 Lori E. Apodaca, Explosives, in U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY: 2009 MINERALS YEARBOOK 
23.1, 23.3 tbl.2 (2010), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ 
commodity/explosives/myb1-2009-explo.pdf. 
5 Cf. Keith J. Zullig & Michael Hendryx, Health-Related Quality of Life Among Central Appala-
chian Residents in Mountaintop Mining Counties, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 848, 848 (2011). 
6 See CATERPILLAR, INC., DRAGLINES: PRODUCT LINE 5-7 (2011), available at 
https://mining.cat.com/cda/files/2884562/7/draglines_AEXQ0595_01.pdf; see also 
CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP MINING: BACK-
GROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2011). 
7 COPELAND, supra note 6, at 1. 
8 See generally KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH (1976); GERALD M. STERN, THE 
BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976). 
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clared “acts of God,” these costs are not included in the 
price of coal.9
 The two-lane roads required to support the enormous 
trucks that haul the coal from mining sites to “loadouts” 
and on to market destinations cost $500,000 per mile, as 
compared to four-lane highways that cost $100,000 per 
mile.
   
10 And the service life of coal haul roads is between 
two and four years, rather than the standard twenty years 
for other roads.11
 And when these ancient organic remains of the peat bogs 
of the Carboniferous Period reach the coal-fired power 
plants that convert 88% of the world’s coal into electricity, 
they become the principle source of human-caused car-
bon dioxide emissions and—if climate scientists are to be 
believed—the principal source of global warming.  Inas-
much as coal-burning power plants have not been forced 
to internalize the costs of such climate change through 
tort suits or other price-effecting mechanisms, such costs 
are not included in the price of their electricity.  Thus, 
those who live in states that rely on coal for the produc-
tion of electricity reap a benefit at the expense of those 
who live in states that do not reciprocally externalize their 
costs of power. 
 These industry-specific infrastructure 
costs are not included in the price of coal. 
One means of forcing an industry (and its consumers) to bear its 
costs along with its benefits is to force it to compensate those to whom 
it externalizes its costs.  Another means of preventing such unjust 
enrichment is by enjoining the industry from imposing more costs on 
others than it and its consumers are reciprocally forced to bear in re-
turn.  But the prospect of turning to tort law for either of these means 
of policing the unjust enrichment of coal-dependent states offends 
Professor Johnston.  As he argues, “a federal judge or jury would get 
to decide that people . . . should bear the entire cost of reducing GHG 
emissions to provide little, if any, benefit (and perhaps actually cause 
harm) to themselves while providing a highly speculative benefit to 
people who reside in other states.” 
 
9 STERN, supra note 8, at 10. 
10 MELISSA FRY KONTY & JASON BAILEY, MOUNTAIN ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., THE 
IMPACT OF COAL ON THE KENTUCKY STATE BUDGET 15 (2009), available at http://www. 
maced.org/coal/documents/Impact_of_Coal.pdf. 
11 Id. 
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But nothing in tort law or its underlying rationales would license 
the notion that a defendant should be required to give up (and make 
reparations for) a harmful or unjustly enriching activity only if there 
will be some (further) resulting benefit in it for him.  That a wrong-
doer will lose the advantages of his wrongdoing if he is forced to give 
it up is hardly an argument for allowing him to continue.  Inasmuch 
as Professor Johnston favors the prospect of using the political arena 
rather than the courts to resolve disputes over GHG emissions, he ap-
pears to think that victims of wrongdoing should have to bribe their 
wrongdoers in order to obtain what they are independently owed.  We 
have courts, however, precisely to guarantee that moral obligations 
are not bought and sold, and that those who are owed justice by oth-
ers do not have to horse-trade for it as though it were a commodity, 
rather than a right. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT  
Public Nuisance Liability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions:   
A Cause of Action that Should Not Exist 
 
JASON SCOTT JOHNSTON 
In responding to Professor Hurd and closing my contribution to 
this debate, I begin with a quick clarification and reminder.  Nowhere 
did I argue that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
courts are “too dishonest or too incompetent” to regulate greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.  Instead, as one can see simply by reading what 
I wrote, I argued that the Supreme Court was wrong to interpret the 
Clean Air Act as covering GHG emissions.  Its decision in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), put the EPA in the position of basing 
regulations on contorted interpretations of the statute and on highly 
uncertain computer projections of future climate produced by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an overtly and in-
tentionally political U.N. institution. 
It is true that my argument against a cause of action in interstate 
public nuisance does rely in part on my conception of the proper role 
for courts in regulating GHG emissions.  But my argument is not that 
courts are incompetent, but rather that Congress, not the parties to 
interstate public nuisance actions, should determine if and how to 
regulate GHG emissions.  As I argued, the substantive standard for 
finding an actionable interstate public nuisance is so amorphous 
that it would become a license for judicial lawmaking if not confined 
within traditional contours. 
Even worse (and adding here to my initial argument), to “regu-
late” GHG emissions through interstate public nuisance cases is to vest 
private individuals and state attorneys general with the power to de-
cide who among us—and all Americans generate some GHG emis-
sions—will be held responsible for the alleged harm from such emis-
sions.  Courts, after all, do not decide who will be sued in interstate 
public nuisance.  To allow private plaintiffs to decide who should pay 
damages for harms allegedly caused by past emissions, as in Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) and Native Village of Ki-
valina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and 
state attorneys general to decide who should bear the cost of reducing 
future GHG emissions, as in American Electric Power Co. (AEP) v. Con-
necticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), is both unfair and likely inefficient.  
There is no reason to expect that judges and juries in different juris-
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dictions will agree on either the costs or benefits of GHG emission re-
duction.  High visibility targets of such litigation—such as the defen-
dants in AEP v. Connecticut—could well be subject to conflicting and 
inconsistent regulatory injunctions.  Common law damage awards 
against deep-pocketed or politically attractive out-of-state defendants 
would substitute for a system of (at least potentially) rational taxation.  
Regulation by public nuisance tort litigation is almost certain to gener-
ate a haphazard, variable, and highly politicized pattern of injunctive 
relief and damages awards that bears little, if any, relationship to either 
a fair or efficient approach to reducing national GHG emissions. 
Of course, neither this form of distributional unfairness nor the 
potential inefficiency of interstate public nuisance actions is necessari-
ly relevant in Professor Hurd’s model of tort law.  In her view, tort law 
is “best justified by its unique ability to vindicate moral rights and to 
compel compensation for moral wrongs.”  As Professor Hurd elabo-
rates, tort law comes into play both to compensate people who have 
been “culpably caused harm” and to serve the goal of “restoration” 
when others have “deliberately externalized to them the costs of an 
activity, while asymmetrically internalizing its benefits.” 
These theories have been attractive to some philosophically 
minded torts scholars and are much discussed in the law review litera-
ture.  I am happy to concede that the objective of furthering some no-
tion of corrective justice is consistent with and may partly explain the 
doctrinal structure of traditional tort law.  However, the plaintiffs in 
AEP v. Connecticut sought injunctive relief that was explicitly regulatory 
and that was—almost as explicitly—intended to provoke Congress to 
enact comprehensive global warming legislation.  The closely related 
goal of deterring the defendants from continuing to emit relatively 
high levels of GHGs was an additional objective of the plaintiffs in AEP 
v. Connecticut, as well as in the Village of Kivalina and Comer lawsuits.  In 
the latter two cases, moreover, the plaintiffs sought billions of dollars 
in compensatory damages.  Thus the global warming public nuisance 
lawsuits are all about using tort law for the instrumental purposes of 
regulating and/or provoking legislation, deterring tortious behavior, 
and compensating plaintiffs.  If Professor Hurd does not believe that 
tort liability furthers any of these goals, but merely serves the pursuit 
of corrective justice, then it is hard to see how she can support the 
global warming public nuisance lawsuits. 
Whatever may be the fundamental justification for tort liability, 
courts seem to think of torts as particular causes of action, with the 
plaintiffs required to plead and prove various elements of each cause 
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of action.  The causes of action at issue in the global warming public 
nuisance cases are interstate public nuisance and also (although not 
addressed by the Court in AEP v. Connecticut) state law public nuis-
ance.  In my opening I argued that the federal courts have understood 
and (let me clarify, lest I make a “category mistake”) should continue 
to view interstate public nuisance as having an extremely limited role, 
one that has now been made obsolete by expansive congressional reg-
ulatory power.  As for state law public nuisance, Professor Thomas W. 
Merrill of Columbia Law School explains in great detail in an article 
forthcoming in the Journal of Tort Law that William Prosser—upon 
whom Professor Hurd relies as approving an extremely broad correc-
tive-justice mission for tort law—believed that the common law nar-
rowly defined a “public nuisance” as a “criminal interference with a right 
common to all members of the public.”  Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public 
Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT LAW (forthcoming Oct. 2011) (manuscript 
at 24), available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol4/iss2/art4.  If 
Prosser was correct—and Merrill argues persuasively that he was—
then state law public nuisance liability would lie only for actions that 
were criminal.  To my knowledge, no state has criminalized the act of 
burning coal to generate electric power—the defendants’ actions in 
AEP v. Connecticut—or of producing oil and refining gasoline and other 
petroleum products—the actions of the majority of the defendants in 
Village of Kivalina and Comer. 
Professor Hurd does not quite advocate the criminalization of coal 
and oil production and use, but she comes close. In responding to my 
argument that it would not make much sense for the American feder-
al courts to order the reduction of the GHG emissions of selected 
American firms unless the GHG emissions of China, India, and other 
industrializing countries are also controlled, she argues: 
When someone joins a gang in stabbing a victim, the fact that the cuts he 
inflicts are small relative to those inflicted by others does not defeat the 
conviction that he concurrently causes the victim’s death when the victim 
bleeds to death, in part, through his smaller wounds.  The fact that the vic-
tim would have bled to death anyway is neither here nor there . . . .” 
I must confess that I had never thought to analogize to a con-
certed gang stabbing the activities of firms that produce the electricity 
and power used by the automobiles, trains, and planes that most 
Americans rely upon for everyday life.  As for Professor Hurd’s analo-
gy, it is one thing to hold liable someone who makes only a de mini-
mis contribution to causing harm but whose conduct—intentionally 
stabbing a person—is morally reprehensible.  From a moral point of 
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view, it seems clearly to be justified to hold the stabber liable even if 
he has only inflicted superficial wounds and even if all the other gang 
members escape liability entirely.  It is another thing to issue an in-
junction requiring costly reductions in GHG emissions by only a few 
firms targeted as defendants when in fact everyone in society is emit-
ting GHGs and when many could reduce their GHG emissions at far 
less cost than the targeted defendants. 
According to Professor Hurd, tort law not only serves to “compen-
sat[e] for moral wrongs,” but also to force people who “asymmetrically 
internaliz[e] [the] benefits” of their activities to pay for the harm that 
their activities cause.  This rationale for tort liability—what Professor 
Hurd calls the unjust enrichment branch of corrective justice theory—
seems sound enough in principle.  But Professor Hurd’s example illu-
strating the unjust enrichment principle in practice—the many harm-
ful environmental consequences of mountaintop coal mining—reveals 
the inadequacy of the unjust enrichment theory as applied in the con-
temporary regulatory state.  Coal mining is subject to both state and 
federal regulations that require coal companies to incur substantial 
costs so as to reduce the harm that mining causes to other people.  
Professor Hurd may think that these regulations are inadequate, that 
mountaintop mining should be banned, and that the coal companies 
should have to incur far greater expense to better reclaim the lands 
that they mine and perhaps to compensate people who live nearby.  
But Professor Hurd does not justify public nuisance as remedying in-
adequate regulation, and yet her unjust enrichment theory of tort law 
would seem to require that the adequacy of the regulatory response 
be considered.  For if the regulatory regime were ideal from a cor-
rective-justice point of view—requiring that coal companies internal-
ize all of the harm caused to others by their activities—then it would 
seem that there would be nothing left for tort law to do if the goal of 
tort law were only to compensate and/or take away ill-gotten gains.  
With such an ideal regulatory regime, the only role for tort law 
would seem to be to punish. 
Professor Hurd does not say anything about whether it is appro-
priate to use tort law to punish.  However, her conception of tort 
law—that tort damages “vindicate” moral wrongs—clearly contains a 
normative component, in that someone has to determine that there is 
indeed a “moral wrong” to be “vindicated” with tort damages.  It does 
seem that many self-declared environmentalists are convinced that 
emitting GHGs as a byproduct of producing coal or oil or that using 
those products to produce electricity or to power transportation does 
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constitute such a moral wrong.  But it also seems clear that many, per-
haps most, Americans would violently disagree with such a proposi-
tion.  Determining whether to regulate or tax GHG emitters, and de-
termining which emitters to target given the universality of GHG 
emissions are policy questions whose answers affect the lives and well-
being of virtually every American.  Congress is a highly imperfect insti-
tution, and in my view today’s federal regulatory state is much too in-
trusive, infringing upon the liberty of individuals and stifling business 
competition and entrepreneurial creativity.  In the case of the regula-
tion of GHG emissions, however, we have a remarkable instance in 
which a majority of Congress has repeatedly decided that the case for 
a law requiring unilateral American GHG emission reductions has not 
been made.  That decision should be respected, rather than effectively 
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CLOSING STATEMENT  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Public Nuisances 
 
HEIDI M. HURD 
In his Closing Statement, Professor Johnston concedes that “tradi-
tional” tort suits may be appropriate means of pursuing corrective jus-
tice for wrongfully injured parties.  But he insists that interstate public 
nuisance suits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are not traditional 
tort suits, and because of this, they ought not to serve as vehicles for 
vindicating the rights of those to whom coal-fired power plants have 
externalized their costs.  In this final exchange with my much-
esteemed colleague, I will consider nine claims that he advances in de-
fense of the thesis that public nuisance suits for GHG emissions are 
insufficiently like standard tort cases to justify resolution within the 
courts.  I will conclude our debate by contesting each of these claims, 
making clear that suits for GHG emissions are well within both the 
doctrinal and theoretical boundaries of the common law of torts.  As 
such, they ought not to be thought “displaced” by Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) rulemaking or congressionally enacted stan-
dards, as Professor Johnston has maintained during our exchange and 
as the Court so ruled in American Electric Power (AEP) v. Connecticut, 131 
S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011). 
First, Professor Johnston argues that “the substantive standard for 
finding an actionable interstate public nuisance is so amorphous that 
it would become a license for judicial lawmaking . . . .”  On this basis, 
he insists, Congress, rather than the courts, is the appropriate source 
of GHG emission standards.  There are, of course, numerous causes of 
action in tort law that met with similar complaints upon their emer-
gence and that are well-established grounds for rectification today.  
Consider the cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress.  Inasmuch as all of us give and receive emotional distress all 
too commonly, courts sought to distinguish actionable conduct by re-
quiring that it be “extreme and outrageous.”  W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 61 (5th ed. 1984).  That this is a stan-
dard as amorphous as any has not been a basis for insisting that judges 
are beyond their institutional ken in deciding such cases so as to re-
quire legislative intervention.  And, to take a second example, one 
could hardly think that the “reasonable person test” of negligence is 
not amorphous.  Unless Professor Johnston seeks to join Jeremy Ben-
tham in defending the far more radical thesis that common law adju-
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dication as a whole is an affront to the rule of law, it would seem diffi-
cult for him to maintain that interstate nuisance cases should be 
stripped from the jurisdiction of the courts and settled by Congress 
simply because they turn on a standard that, while vague, is no more 
so than the judgment of the fictional character to whom courts so 
commonly appeal in negligence cases. 
Second, Professor Johnston appears to take the fact that the plain-
tiffs in AEP v. Connecticut sued for injunctive relief rather than damag-
es as an indication that they were not seeking, or entitled to, the sort 
of corrective justice that, in my view, is the distinctive mission of tort 
law.  But if a serial wrongdoer is harming me, my rights of redress in-
clude making him stop!  If someone wrongfully floods my land every 
year, I will of course sue not just for damages but also for injunctive 
relief.  And if I can anticipate far greater flooding in the future than I 
have had to endure to date, I might sue for injunctive relief alone.  
But nothing about the remedy I choose undoes the claim that I am 
entitled to employ tort law to vindicate my rights against the harmful 
activities of a neighbor.  So the fact that states and the citizens they 
represent may seek caps on the GHG emissions of the nation’s largest 
coal-fired power plants that will prevent or reduce predicted harms of 
climate change and pollution does not make their suits something 
other than tort suits that are eligible for resolution as such. 
Third, Professor Johnston appears to believe that, inasmuch as in-
junctive relief will have a deterrent effect on the behavior of the de-
fendants, it is therefore inherently regulatory, and as such, its mission 
bleeds into that of Congress and regulatory agencies.  It is surely true 
that if tort law is principally dedicated to using private disputes to set 
incentives that will deter others from committing wrongs in the future 
or otherwise engaging in conduct that is socially detrimental, then it 
has parted ways with the mission of corrective justice and must com-
pete for jurisdictional space with those who would employ codification 
to this end.  But in most tort cases, including AEP v. Connecticut, deter-
rence is the byproduct of, rather than a substitute for, corrective jus-
tice.  Parties who understand that they will be held liable in the event 
that they cause harm to others will typically prefer to prevent that 
harm than pay compensation.  But the fact that tort suits have deter-
rent side effects does not make tort law’s mission regulatory, and it 
ought not to strip parties who have legitimate grievances of their op-
portunity to employ such law to redress rights violations. 
Fourth, in a somewhat similar vein, Professor Johnston takes pub-
lic nuisance suits for GHG emissions to be unlike traditional tort suits 
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in being “explicitly . . . intended to provoke Congress to enact com-
prehensive global warming legislation.”  They are “all about using tort 
law for the instrumental purposes of regulating and/or provoking leg-
islation . . . .”  He seems to think that the motives of litigants fix 
whether or not their suits vindicate rights or are a ruse for regulation.  
But the motives of litigants do not matter a whit to the legitimacy of 
their causes of action.  If the plaintiffs in AEP v. Connecticut could 
prove that the defendant power plants culpably violated a duty of care 
that was owed to them, and in so doing in fact and proximately caused 
legally cognizable harms, then they are owed injunctive relief against 
future harm and restitution for past harms, irrespective of their moti-
vations for bringing suit.  That they might hope that their vindication 
in tort will motivate agency or legislative action that safeguards others 
like them from injuries by similar defendants hardly defeats the legi-
timacy of their use of tort law.  To say otherwise would be to suggest 
that the many early suits that were brought by employees who suffered 
injury or discrimination while in the workplace were illegitimately ad-
judicated by the courts, because the plaintiffs who brought such suits 
surely hoped that lawmakers would ultimately enact occupational safe-
ty and health regulations that would better the lives of others who 
were too fearful to stand up for their rights. 
Fifth, Professor Johnston makes reference to the magnitude of the 
liability that would be at stake if public nuisance suits for GHG emis-
sions were allowed to proceed, citing as evidence the billions of dol-
lars in compensatory damages that were sought by the plaintiffs in Na-
tive Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009), and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 
2010).  But why would we reserve tort law only for relatively insignifi-
cant harms meriting relatively insignificant damages, while suspend-
ing it when wrongdoers culpably cause harm on a grand scale?  That 
seems exactly backwards.  The larger the injury, the larger the damag-
es that ought to be paid in compensation—as students of tort law 
learn from such chestnut cases as In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 
[1921] 3 K.B. 560, in which a defendant was held liable for the total 
destruction of a ship after the defendant’s merely careless employees 
accidentally caused a plank to fall into the ship’s hold, causing a spark 
that ignited petrol vapors.  So when damages provably come in the bil-
lions, we ought not to declare them too great to be owed. 
Sixth, Professor Johnston places considerable weight in both his 
Opening and Closing Statements on the claim that, inasmuch as “all 
Americans generate some GHG emissions,” it would be wrong “to vest 
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private individuals and state attorneys general with the power to de-
cide who among us . . . will be held responsible for the alleged harm 
from such emissions.”  As he argues, “[c]ommon law damage awards 
against deep-pocketed or politically attractive out-of-state defendants 
would substitute for a system of (at least potentially) rational taxa-
tion.”  But the plaintiffs in AEP v. Connecticut, for example, were hardly 
being arbitrary in their choice of defendants:  they sued the largest 
emitters of carbon dioxide in the nation.  While the plaintiffs them-
selves could be thought to cause GHG emissions of the sort they com-
plained of, none caused emissions at levels anything like those caused 
by the defendants.  The plaintiffs were not suing the defendants be-
cause the defendants had deep pockets or were politically attractive; 
they were suing them because the defendants caused, and could be 
predicted to cause, more harm to them than plaintiffs had caused, or 
would reciprocally cause, in return.  Inasmuch as plaintiffs are owed 
corrective justice when others have been provably enriched at their 
expense, there is no basis for complaining that their suits are unfair 
just because they might also have sued others, or just because others 
might have escaped similar suits for similar redress by others in simi-
larly situated circumstances. 
Seventh, Professor Johnston fears that public nuisance cases for 
GHG emissions uniquely threaten the prospect of inconsistent ver-
dicts that will result in “a haphazard, variable, and highly politicized 
pattern of injunctive relief and damages awards . . . .”  As he argues, 
“[t]here is no reason to expect that judges and juries in different ju-
risdictions will agree on either the costs or benefits of GHG emission 
reduction,” and as such, such suits will invite patchwork results that 
“bear[] little, if any, relationship to either a fair or efficient approach 
to reducing national GHG emissions.”  Perhaps so.  But the possibility 
of inconsistent verdicts is endemic to tort law, and the mechanisms for 
reducing the costs of such inconsistencies function as well in the con-
text of public nuisance suits as they do generally.  We have appellate 
courts precisely so that we do not whipsaw defendants with contradic-
tory legal rulings; and we have doctrines of collateral estoppel so that 
we do not whipsaw defendants with contradictory factual findings.  
Together these mechanisms considerably reduce the degree to which 
defendants can be threatened with liability that damns them if they do 
and damns them if they don’t. 
Eighth, Professor Johnston appears to suggest that in champion-
ing the rights of redress on the part of parties who have been, or will 
be, harmed by anthropogenic climate change I have no account of 
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how Congress or the EPA might play a legitimate role in fixing GHG 
emission standards.  But I have no difficulty agreeing that global 
warming merits a regulatory solution that will systemically work toward 
ensuring that none of us exceeds the level of GHG emissions that is 
our due, given the goal, for example, of returning the atmospheric 
level of carbon dioxide to 350 parts per million (ppm).  While tort law 
can and should redress unjust enrichment, its perfect success at so 
doing would simply ensure that none of us emits GHG emissions that 
are disproportionate to the emissions of others.  But such tort suits, 
even if fully successful, might easily fail to reduce GHG emissions to a 
level that will save the planet from catastrophic climate change.  I thus 
fully agree that it will likely take bold and broad statutory enactments 
and agency-issued regulations to guarantee more than the assurance 
that no one got the better of us as we go to Hell together! 
Finally, Professor Johnston suggests that if I concede that regula-
tion of GHG emissions by Congress or the EPA might be in order, I 
thereby nullify any long-term role for tort law with respect to such 
emissions.  He writes: 
For if the regulatory regime were ideal from a corrective-justice point of 
view—requiring that coal companies internalize all of the harm caused 
to others by their activities—then it would seem that there would be 
nothing for tort law to do if the goal of tort law were only to compensate 
and/or take away ill-gotten gains. 
So true!  But that is a bit like saying that there would be no need 
for the criminal justice system if our criminal codes were so perfected 
that, by themselves, they eliminated criminal wrongdoing altogether.  
In fact, we can anticipate that people will never cease to indulge temp-
tations to take more than is their due, even when their due is clearly 
specified—by statute, regulation, or common law.  So long as there 
will be wrongdoers who defy rules that are designed to protect others 
from injuries, there will be a need for courts to exact compensation 
for such injuries; for however perfectly Congress and our regulatory 
agencies specify optimal conduct, such rulemaking bodies do not have 
adjudicatory powers and therefore cannot adequately redress rule vi-
olations.  And, of course, we have yet to see Congress or the EPA craft 
regulations that, if followed, would perfectly insure against the need 
to achieve corrective justice for those wrongfully harmed by GHG 
emissions.  As illustrated by my previous discussion of the costs exter-
nalized by coal-burning power plants, we have a long way to go before 
our many federal and state regulations perfectly specify all the things 
that the coal industry, and the industries that depend upon it, must 
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do in order to undo the myriad harms that are caused by coal.  Still, at 
the end of the day, I have no stake in tort law surviving the achieve-
ment of human perfection.  If everyone ceases to do wrong (thanks, in 
part, to effective regulation), I will surely grant Professor Johnston his 
claim that tort law will be out of business.  As Grant Gilmore famously 
observed:  “In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down 
with the lamb.”  GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 
(1977).  But until we find ourselves in that happy place, our courts 
should vigorously vindicate our rights against the climate-changing 
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